Although a signaling bell system was not identified as the cause of the Hillcrest mining disaster a methane ignition was. The catastrophic loss of life and assets associated with coal mining ignitions are clearly evident when reviewing the aftermath of the events occurring in June 2014 at Hillcrest Mine, Hillcrest, Alberta.
At the time, Hillcrest was considered to be the safest, best run coal mining operation around. There were 377 men on the Hillcrest Mine payroll at the time and the average wage was a respectable $125.00 a month. The Hillcrest catastrophe occurred just before World War I, and perhaps as a consequence, is largely forgotten. Fifty years later, author and historian Frank W. Anderson researched the story of what happened at Hillcrest, and in 1969 he wrote a book titled Canada’s Worst Mine Disaster. Much of the information in this article is based on his book.
On that Friday morning in June 2014, the mine had been idle the previous two days due to overproduction of coal. A scenario known to be of concern due to the off gassing of methane from the coal being released from its tight confines. Before 7:00 AM, the fireboss, William Adkin, had completed his mine inspection and posted a notice in the lamphouse warning of some low levels of methane gas along with some cave-ins in various parts of the mine. Moisture levels that day were considered adequate to keep the coal dust ignition risk at bay.
Air was flowing through the mine using two large electric fans which was known to reduce the methane build up risks.
Fireboss Sam Charleton had laid charges near Level One located in Hillcrest Mine One. Hillcrest actually consisted of two mines — Mine Number One and Mine Number Two each with their separate entrances and linked together by underground tunnels. At 9:30 a.m., Sam Charleton had was preparing wire the charges to fire them and loosen the shifts coal to be mined and loaded when a gas explosion occurred very close to him. This initial explosion stirred up coal dust which then spontaneously cascaded into a second much larger blast. The force of the multiple explosions travelling along the labyrinth of tunnels was horrific. Anyone near the source, like Sam Charleton, was killed instantly. Even men working on the surface were not spared: two young rope-riders who worked topside of Mine Number One and Mine Number Two were killed.
The entrance to Mine Number One, which was closer to the source of the explosion than Mine Number Two’s entrance, was jammed up so much debris that it was impassable. Three men who had been just inside the entrance of Mine Number Two managed to escape from the mine within the first few minutes. A trickle of survivors followed them. After fifteen minutes had passed, the total count of survivors was only 19 — all the others were unaccounted for.
Surviving the explosions was only part of the fatal risk. The next danger was poisoning and suffocation. Afterdamp is a mixture of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide which are all byproducts of firedamp explosions. Firedamp referring to explosive gas mixtures of primarily methane before ignition. Carbon monoxide deprives victims of oxygen by preferentially combining with hemoglobin in the blood.
Animal sentinels, such as mice or canaries, which are more sensitive to carbon monoxide than humans were iconically used in coal mines to detect the presence of carbon monoxide. A canaries rapid breathing rate, small size, and high metabolism, caused it to succumb to carbon monoxide long before the miners providing an early warning of impending trouble. This was a precursor to electronic gas detection commonly used in may facilities today.
Realizing this, the first thought of the men on the surface was to suck out the deadly afterdamp with the exhaust fan located at the entrance of Mine Number One. Miraculously, the men found that the intake fan at the entrance of Mine Number Two continued to operator through the explosion. Air flow is a critical component that must be understood when determining Area Classification.
Despite imminent risk to themselves, many men immediately re-entered the mine to help their colleagues. Not all of the men re-entering the mine survived, succumbing to the afterdamp themselves.
By 10:00 a.m., more help and vital oxygen masks arrived from the nearby towns of Blairmore, Coleman and Frank, Alberta. Under the direction of Dr. William Dodd, an emergency hospital tent with oxygen and resuscitation equipment was set up outside the mine entrance. The oxygen masks allowed the heroic rescue crews, their numbers now bolstered by the new arrivals, to push deeper into the mine. By now workers had managed to clear a small hole in the blocked entrance of Mine Number One allowing rescue workers to enter with the aid of oxygen masks.
Initially, it was assumed that fireboss Sam Charleton might have triggered a unintended secondary explosion when he set off his controlled explosion to loosen the next section of coal to be mined, but Harry White’s detailed post explosion observations put an end to that speculation. Sam Charleton’s body was found with the firing cable still wrapped around his waist indicating that he had not yet unwound it and was not ready to set off the next controlled blast. A more likely cause was that a build up of methane was set off by a lamp flare, electric cable short, or even a rock fall.
By 11:30 a.m., there were forty men who had gotten out of the mine alive. However most were not that lucky. Rescuers came across many bodies of miners who had survived the initial explosions only to succumb to afterdamp. Just after 11:30 AM rescuers found a group of seven men who were still breathing. All seven were brought to the surface and revived. They were the last survivors. Forty-six of those rescued from the mine, after the explosion remained alive. 188 bodies were eventually brought to the surface.
Smoke from the explosions continued to issue forth from the mine for hours. Although the danger from further explosions was high, the rescue teams continued to go into the mine to bring up the bodies. By Saturday afternoon 162 bodies had been viewed by the coroner and passed for burial. Within a week of the explosion, only two bodies had not yet been found. One other was found in July, and the last body was never found.